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h i g h l i g h t s
• We study the determinants of political polarization using a BMA approach.
• Trust and income inequality are robust determinants of political polarization.
• Higher trust decreases political polarization.
• Higher income inequality increases political polarization.
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a b s t r a c t
In this article, we aim to identify the main determinants of political polarization using Bayesian Model
Averaging to overcome the problem of model uncertainty. We find that the level of trust within a country
and the degree of income inequality are the most robust determinants of political polarization.
© 2016 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Political polarization has a major influence on economic
performance andhas been shown to significantly affect investment
rates (Azzimonti, 2011), fiscal policy (Lindqvist and Östling, 2010;
Song, 2012), legislative productivity (Hacker, 2004; McCarty et al.,
2006), macroeconomic volatility (Alt and Lassen, 2006; Azzimonti
and Talbert, 2014), income inequality (McCarty et al., 2006), and,
eventually, the development path of the economy (Frye, 2002).
Political polarization reflects the degree of the divergence of
attitudes toward political matters in a society and might in turn
depend on the evolution of economic outcomes. Whether political
polarization is a historical, cultural, or economic phenomenon is an
empirical question.
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0/).In this paper, we address this question by studying the de-
terminants of political polarization in a sample of 66 countries.
Given that little is known about the main underlying factors
that affect political polarization, we use the Bayesian Model Av-
eraging (BMA) method of estimation to account for model un-
certainty. To estimate political polarization, we use measures
based on voters’ self-reported political preferences as constructed
by Lindqvist and Östling (2010). We extend their variables to
include more countries, relying on data from the World Val-
ues Survey. We consider three groups of potential explanatory
variables: economic, socio-historical, and geographic. The vari-
ables are selected from related discussions in the political science
literature.
We find that the most robust determinants of political
polarization are trust and income inequality in a country. A lower
level of trust and higher income inequality contribute to higher
political polarization. This implies that political polarization is a
socio-historical and an economic phenomenon.
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2.1. The measures of political polarization
We construct the political polarization measures using data
from the World Values Survey (WVS).1 The WVS consists of
nationally representative surveys conducted in waves once every
five years, on average, using a common questionnaire, and
includes about 1000 respondents per country-wave. We include
countries from different survey waves to maximize the number
of observations. Thus, we use information from five waves of this
survey covering the time period 1990–2013, for 66 countries for
which all necessary data is available.
For each wave and for each country in the sample, we construct
the political polarization measures by computing the standard
deviation of the scores the responders assign in response to the
question ‘‘Howwould you place your views on this scale [from 1 to
10]?’’ for the following statements:
1. 1 means that you completely agree with the statement, ‘‘People
should take more responsibility to provide for themselves’’,
and 10 means that you completely agree with the statement,
‘‘The government should take more responsibility to ensure
that everyone is provided for’’.
2. 1 means that you completely agree with the statement,
‘‘Incomes should be made more equal’’, and 10 means that you
completely agree with the statement, ‘‘We need larger income
differences as incentives’’.
3. 1means that you completely agreewith the statement, ‘‘Private
ownership of business should be increased’’, and 10 means
that you completely agree with the statement, ‘‘Government
ownership of business should be increased’’.
These questions reflect attitudes to different policy problems:
government spending, income inequality, and private–state own-
ership. We denote the respective polarization measures as GOV,
ININ, and PRST; their descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1.
2.2. Potential determinants of political polarization
We distinguish three groups of potential determinants of
political polarization: economic, socio-historical, and geographic.
Below we describe each potential determinant of political
polarization in detail.
Economic determinants
1. The real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. We
want to study whether political polarization is (at least partially)
determined by a country’s economic conditions. The GDP is the
most common measure of economic performance and has been
shown to be a significant factor promoting the emergence of
democratic political institutions (see Londregan and Poole, 1996).
We expect higher GDP to decrease political polarization. Data
Source: World Bank.
2. Income inequality. This variable is the most frequently
discussed correlate of political polarization in the literature (see
Garand, 2010; Londregan and Poole, 1996; McCarty et al., 2006;
Pontusson and Rueda, 2008, among others). We consider the
Gini coefficient after redistribution as the measure of income
inequality. Data Source: World Income Inequality Database.
3. Globalization. Similar to GDP, globalization, or the openness
of a country to foreign capital flows, is a proxy for economic devel-
opment. Globalization can be affected by political frictions within
1 Other authors relied on the political polarization measures constructed from
surveys; see, for example, Alt and Lassen (2006), Lindqvist and Östling (2010), and
Iversen and Soskice (2015).Table 1
Summary statistics.
Variable Mean SD Correlation with:
GOV ININ PRST
Polarization measures
GOV 2.810 0.363 1.000
ININ 2.799 0.364 0.755 1.000
PRST 2.684 0.441 0.831 0.836 1.000
Time-invariant variables
Fractionalization 0.132 0.149 0.267 0.263 0.322
Absolute latitude 0.378 0.181 −0.534 −0.391 −0.435
Time-varying variables
Media status 1.780 0.777 0.243 0.325 0.466
Trust 0.575 0.055 −0.465 −0.455 −0.556
Income inequality 37.409 9.359 0.605 0.568 0.572
FDI (% of GDP) 17.600 16.921 −0.325 −0.222 −0.287
Gov. Exp. (% of GDP) 15.422 5.104 −0.578 −0.351 −0.420
Real GDP (Ln) 8.451 1.491 −0.403 −0.386 −0.620
Pop. density 115.377 142.105 0.098 −0.071 0.045
Democracy 7.539 2.553 −0.174 −0.291 −0.408
a country, and can influence the evolution of political frictions. We
measure globalization as the foreign direct investment share of the
GDP. Data Source: Sturm and De Haan (2015).
4. Government expenditure (% of GDP). The size of the public
sector depends on political frictions, in particular, on political
polarization (Lindqvist and Östling, 2010). However, government
expenditures can affect the evolution of political attitudes in
society. A government that spends a significant fraction of its
revenues on public goods, such as schools or medical care, can
improve the overall social attitude towardpoliticians in society and
decrease political polarization. We use the general government
final consumption expenditure. Data Source: World Bank.
Socio-historical determinants
5. Media status. The degree of proliferation, independence,
and overall quality of the media can have a nontrivial effect on
political polarization in a country through a direct influence on
public opinion. Bernhardt et al. (2008), DellaVigna and Kaplan
(2007), Gerber et al. (2009), and Prior (2013) study the relationship
between the media and political polarization. As a measure of
media quality, we use the indicator of freedomof the press, defined
as follows: (1) free, (2) partly free, and (3) not free. Data source:
Freedom House.
6. Ethnolinguistic fractionalization. This variable accounts
for cultural diversity, which can influence the distribution of
attitudes to political matters. Esteban and Ray (2011) consider
fractionalization and inequality as proxies for polarization and
determinants of conflict in a country. Data source: We use the
ethnolinguistic fractionalization measure constructed by Desmet
et al. (2012), variable ELF(1).
7. Trust (a proxy for social networks). Political polarization
can be a consequence of social interactions and discussions. An
individual’s opinion about a particular party or policy can be
affected by the opinions of his or her neighbors, relatives, or
friends. Axelrod (1997), Baldassarri and Bearman (2007), and
Iversen and Soskice (2015), among others, study the role of social
networks in political polarization. As a proxy of social networks,we
use themeasure of trust in the country, computed as the inverse of
the average value of the responses to the statement ‘‘Most people
can be trusted’’ (‘‘yes’’ is counted as 1, ‘‘no’’ is counted as 2) for each
country and wave in the WVS survey. Data source: WVS.
8. Democracy. Democratic societies have more freedom in
defining, discussing, and adjusting their political attitudes. As a
measure of democracy in the country, we use the Freedom House
indicator,which ranges from0 to10where 0 is the least democratic
and 10 is the most democratic. Data source: Freedom House.
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9. Population density. This variable can influence the quantity
and quality of communications among a country’s citizens (social
networks), if face-to-face communication is preferred to phone or
the internet. Data source: World Bank.
10. Absolute latitude. This variable is a proxy for a country’s
geographic factors. Togetherwith ethnolinguistic fractionalization,
this time-invariant factor accounts for unobserved country hetero-
geneity. Data source: World Bank.
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for all listed explana-
tory variables.
3. Methodology
We identify the underlying factors that explain the political
polarization by using a BMA approach2 to account for model
uncertainty. We consider a linear regression model:
y = β0 + βX+ ε, (1)
where y is the measure of political polarization and a set of its
potential determinants is denoted by X. We have ten potential
regressors described in Section 2.2. The BMA estimatesmodels,Mj,
for all possible combinations of the regressors, j = 1, . . . , 210, and
determines themodelswith the highest likelihood. The probability
thatMj is the ‘‘true’’ model given the data, Pr(Mj|D), is the ratio of
its marginal likelihood to the sum of marginal likelihoods over the
entire model space:
Pr(Mj|D) = Pr(D|Mj) Pr(Mj)
 210
i=1
Pr(D|Mi) Pr(Mi)
 , (2)
where
Pr(D|Mj) =

Pr

D|β j,Mj

Pr

β j|Mj

dβ j, (3)
and β j is the vector of parameters from model Mj, Pr(β j|Mj) is a
prior probability distribution assigned to the parameters of model
Mj, and Pr(Mj) is the prior probability that Mj is the true model.
The posterior inclusion probability (PIP) is the probability that a
particular variable h belongs to the true model:
Pr(βh ≠ 0|D) =

j:βh∈Mj,βh≠0
Pr

Mj|D

. (4)
The estimated posterior means and variance of βˆ =
(βˆ1, . . . , βˆ10) are constructed as
E(βˆ|D) =
210
i=1
βˆ Pr (Mi|D) , (5)
Var(βˆ|D) =
210
i=1

Var(βˆ|D,Mi)+ βˆ2

Pr (Mi|D)− E

βˆ|D
2
. (6)
For the implementation of the BMA methodology, we try a
number of different priors on the parameter space and on the
model space. We report the results for uniform prior on the model
space and ‘‘hyper-g’’ prior on the parameter space, although our
conclusions are robust to different specifications of the priors.3
We consider cross-section and panel data separately. The
cross-section data include 66 countries, one observation for
2 Moral-Benito (2012) describes the use of BMA in detail.
3 See Zeugner and Feldkircher (2009) on advantages of ‘‘hyper-g’’ prior.each country, annual data for years in the range 1990–2013.
When more than one survey wave is available for a particular
country, we consider the data from the most recent survey. The
dependent variable is the measure of political polarization in
country–year. The time-varying economic explanatory variables
are the averages over five-year periods (to smooth the effect
of economic fluctuations) starting from the year preceding the
survey.
In order to explore the availability of the data and increase the
number of observations and the information set, we also consider
unbalanced panel data for 66 countries, 1–5 observations per coun-
try (survey waves). We capture unobserved heterogeneity across
countries using the absolute latitude and ethnolinguistic fraction-
alization measures. In order to capture unobserved common fac-
tors across countries we use cross-sectionally de-meaned data (by
subtracting from each observation the mean of the variable across
the countries for every time period). For the panel model, we use
the lags of the regressors which are not from the survey (to miti-
gate simultaneity and to account for the lag between the moment
when the surveywas conducted and the economic conditionswere
recorded).
4. Results
The results of the cross-section and panel estimates, presented
in Table 2, suggest that the most robust determinants of political
polarization (which have the highest PIP across all political
polarization measures) are trust and income inequality. The
only exception is the panel estimates for the PRST polarization
measure where real GDP and trust constitute robust determinants
of polarization (PIP = 0.9770 and 0.9888, respectively),
while income inequality has a PIP of 0.5049 (implying weak
evidence for a regressor). Higher trust reduces polarization,
and higher inequality increases polarization, for all polarization
measures. In particular, an increase in our measure of trust
by one standard deviation decreases political polarization by
approximately 0.17–0.40 standard deviations, on average, and an
increase in income inequality by one standard deviation increases
political polarization by 0.09–0.36 standard deviations, on average,
with exact effects depending on the polarization measure.
For the political polarization measure that reflects the attitude
to the size of the government, GOV, the government expenditure
is another robust determinant. A larger government reduces
disagreement in a society about how large the government
expenditures should be. This can be, at least partially, because
fewer people might prefer an increase in the size of government if
the current size of government is large (see Lindqvist and Östling,
2010). This points to a possible shortcoming of the polarization
measures used: The attitude toward a particular policy can be
influenced by the existing status of that policy.
The remaining variables have a low PIP and insignificant
coefficients, implying that there is insufficient evidence to consider
these variables as regressors.
The results from Table 2 indicate the robust correlates
of the political polarization measures. We cannot claim any
causal relationship between these determinants and political
polarization, because of reverse causality. As a robustness test, we
estimate a pooled OLS model including trust or income inequality
and their interactionswith a dummy for democracy as explanatory
variables. If polarization affects income inequality or trust level
in the society, its correlation with these variables should be
stronger in democratic societies where voters havemore influence
on political outcomes. The results presented in Table 3 suggest
that the relationship between political polarization and income
inequality or trust is not significantly affected by the degree of
democracy, supporting the view that income inequality and trust
affect polarization.
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The determinants of political polarization: cross-section and panel estimates.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GOV ININ PRST GOV ININ PRST
Trust 0.8835 0.9588 0.9794 0.8765 0.9087 0.9888
−1.6483 −2.3735 −3.2041 −1.1491 −1.3941 −2.2349
0.8807 0.9495 1.0765 0.6285 0.6963 0.6758
Income inequality 0.9691 0.8973 0.8874 0.9270 0.9777 0.5049
0.0141 0.0114 0.0139 0.0097 0.0125 0.0041
0.0051 0.0060 0.0074 0.0044 0.0045 0.0053
Real GDP 0.2812 0.3997 0.5613 0.1803 0.2226 0.9770
0.0081 0.0176 −0.0388 −0.0013 0.0007 −0.1115
0.0199 0.0329 0.0445 0.0112 0.0152 0.0376
Gov. Exp. (% of GDP) 0.9796 0.2631 0.3321 0.9977 0.2671 0.3635
−0.0223 −0.0009 −0.0038 −0.0209 −0.0014 −0.0034
0.0075 0.0045 0.0077 0.0053 0.0039 0.0060
Media status 0.4558 0.2674 0.2042 0.2482 0.7075 0.5504
−0.0354 −0.0061 −0.0012 0.0135 0.0707 0.0717
0.0504 0.0372 0.0339 0.0400 0.0626 0.0864
Absolute latitude 0.1925 0.2617 0.2385 0.2502 0.2714 0.2645
−0.0140 0.0062 0.0457 −0.0510 0.0517 0.0701
0.1174 0.1517 0.1906 0.1381 0.1442 0.1795
Fractionalization 0.1789 0.2428 0.2088 0.5488 0.3606 0.7599
0.0074 0.0131 0.0267 0.1699 0.0859 0.3621
0.0823 0.1129 0.1287 0.1948 0.1588 0.2686
FDI (% of GDP) 0.1837 0.3336 0.2452 0.2000 0.3132 0.4379
0.0000 0.0008 0.0006 −0.0002 0.0007 0.0017
0.0010 0.0019 0.0019 0.0009 0.0015 0.0024
Democracy 0.2150 0.4596 0.2925 0.3059 0.2789 0.3383
0.0010 −0.0138 −0.0064 0.0062 0.0012 0.0108
0.0093 0.0213 0.0166 0.0137 0.0124 0.0217
Pop. density 0.1867 0.2714 0.1947 0.1790 0.2669 0.1803
−0.0000 −0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0000
0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Number of obs. 66 66 66 133 133 133
The table reports the BMA results with uniform model prior and ‘‘hyper-g’’ prior. The title of each column indicates the dependent variable. Columns (1)–(3) present cross-
section estimates; Columns (4)–(6) present panel estimates. For cross-section estimates time-varying economic explanatory variables are averages over five years, t − 1 to
t − 5. For each explanatory variable, each column contains results in the following order: posterior inclusion probability (PIP), posterior mean, and standard deviation. PIP
indicates evidence for a regressor: 0.50–0.75—weak, 0.75–0.95 positive, 0.95–1.00 strong evidence (Raftery, 1995). PIPs higher than 0.8 are presented in bold.Table 3
The determinants of political polarization and the role of democracy.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GOV GOV ININ ININ PRST PRST
Trust −3.289*** −3.058** −3.517**
(1.138) (1.526) (1.610)
Income inequality 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.019***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.007)
Trust * Democratic 1.643 1.706 1.561
(1.321) (1.626) (1.734)
Democratic −1.134 −0.029 −1.210 −0.029 −1.311 −0.004
(0.753) (0.277) (0.913) (0.298) (0.977) (0.365)
Income inequality * Democratic −0.004 −0.004 −0.013
(0.008) (0.009) (0.010)
Constant 5.048*** 2.563*** 4.442*** 2.120*** 5.057*** 2.415***
(0.688) (0.115) (0.922) (0.148) (0.973) (0.178)
Year dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 159 140 159 140 159 140
R-squared 0.413 0.486 0.387 0.422 0.509 0.509
The results are obtained using OLS. The title of each column indicates the dependent variable. Democratic = 1 if the Freedom House measure of democracy = 10. Robust
standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.5. Conclusions
The results of this study suggest that the most robust
determinants of political polarization in a society are trust and
income inequality. Higher trust in people and lower income
inequality reduce political polarization. Government expenditures
and real GDP appear to be the other significant factors that reducepolitical polarization in a country. We conclude that political
polarization is a socio-historical and an economic phenomenon.
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